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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GAVILAN OPERATING INCORPORATED, 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
et al. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 880090 
Category No. 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Bankruptcy estate never properly abandoned its 
interest in the well or the redemption rights. The Bankruptcy 
Court ordered the trustee to abandon "the bankrupts interest" 
in the well. Yet all of the bankrupt's interest passed to the 
bankruptcy estate. Paiute Oil therefore owned no interest in 
the well or the redemption rights when it purportedly assigned 
those rights to Wind River, who then sold its interest to 
Gavilan. The redemption is therefore invalid. 
The redemption rights are a personal asset of the 
debtor not attached to the well itself. These personal 
rights, analogous to a cause of action, were never abandoned 
by the trustee and were never property of the debtor. Wind 
River therefore gained no interest in the redemption rights. 
Gavilan erroneously argues that it complied with Rule 
69(f)(2). The record demonstrates that necessary documents 
were available to Wind River who nonetheless chose not to file 
them. The flawed attempt to comply with Rule 69 should not 
even constitute minimal compliance, let alone substantial 
compliance. Moreover, the trial court misapplied this Court's 
decision in Mollerup v. Storage Systems, International, 569 
P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977) when it granted Wind River relief in 
equity because Tech-Fluid was not guilty of any inequitable 
conduct. 
In additional to not complying with Rule 69(f)(2), 
Wind River also failed to post the proper redemption price. 
Wind River should have posted the amount of Tech-Fluid's 
lien. Rule 69(f)(2) and case law require a party redeeming 
from a purchasing creditor to pay that creditor's lien in 
full. This interpretation of Rule 69 will give each party the 
benefit of the bargain and encourage all parties interested in 
the property to bid at the foreclosure sale. 
In the alternative, if Wind River posted the property 
amount, then it redeemed the well subject to the Tech-Fluid 
-2-
lien. Rule 69(f)(5) and Bennion v. Amoss, 530 P.2d 810 (Utah 
1975) support the conclusion that redemption by the assignee 
of the judgment debtor restores the property to its pre-sale 
condition, which is, of course, property encumbered by the 
lien. By redeeming, Wind River only stopped the issuance of 
the sheriff's deed. It did not obtain an oil well free and 
clear of liens for $4300.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REDEMPTION RIGHTS TO OIL WELL ND13-1 PASSED TO THE 
TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AND WERE NOT ABANDONED TO PAIUTE OIL. 
In order to fully understand Tech-Fluid's argument 
regarding abandonment this Court should review the Order of 
the Bankruptcy Court. The Order provided for two separate 
actions: Tech-Fluid was granted relief from automatic stay 
and the trustee was ordered to "abandon all the bankrupt's 
interest in Well ND13-1." It is the legal effect of the 
second sentence of that Order that is in dispute in this case. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) all legal and 
equitable interest in property the debtor owned at the time of 
filing became property of the estate. This included the 
debtor's interest in Well ND13-1 and any redemption rights 
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that the debtor owned. See In re Patio Springs/ 6 BR 428, 431 
(BCD Utah 1980); also Layton v. Layton, 140 P.2d 759 (Utah 
1943). 
Thus, at the time plaintiff filed a petition for 
relief from the automatic stay to foreclose its interest in 
Well ND13-1, the bankruptcy estate owned the debtor's (Paiute 
Oil) interest in the well. The trustee abandoned the 
"bankrupt's" interest in the well. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
541(a), however, the "bankrupt" had no interest in the well as 
its interest had already passed to the bankruptcy estate. 
Thus by the express language of the Order the estate's 
interest was not abandoned. Although this may have not been 
what the trustee intended, no party has moved to modify the 
order to abandon the estate's interest in either the well or 
the redemption rights. 
11 U.S.C. 541(a) provides: 
Unless the Court orders otherwise property of 
the estate that is not abandoned under this 
section and that is not administered in the 
case remains property of the estate. 
In summary, the redemption rights became property of 
the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1). The bankruptcy 
order granted Tech-Fluid relief from the automatic stay and 
ordered the trustee to abandon the bankrupt's interest in the 
well. Since the bankrupt, Paiute Oil, owned no interest in 
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the well or the redemption rights, nothing was abandoned. The 
estate never abandoned its interest in the well or the 
redemption rights. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 554, the estates 
interests in the redemption rights remained property of the 
estate* Wind River therefore acquired nothing because Paiute 
did not own the redemption rights when they purportedly 
received an assignment of rights. Tech-Fluid is therefore 
entitled to a sheriff's deed. 
POINT II 
A RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IS A PERSONAL RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE 
SIMILAR TO A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS NOT AN INTEREST IN REAL 
ESTATE ITSELF, AND THEREFORE IS STILL PROPERTY OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE. 
Even if this Court determines that the estate 
abandoned the well, it never abandoned the redemption rights 
because they are not rights in the real estate but are rights 
personal to the debtor. 
Gavilan, Inc. misconstrued plaintiff's argument 
regarding ownership of the redemption rights to the Paiute Oil 
well. Tech-Fluid is not claiming that the bankruptcy trustee 
may reclaim property after it has been abandoned. 
Tech-Fluid's position is the redemption rights are a personal 
asset of the debtor separate from the property itself which 
was not abandoned when the trustee abandoned the well. 
-5-
Gavilan's citation to In re Tarpley, 4 BR 145 (Tenn 
1980), In re Cruseturner, 8 BR 581 (DC Utah 1981) and other 
cases do not apply to this case because the property in 
question, redemption rights, was never abandoned. 
Moreover Gavilan's argument that none of Tech-Fluid's 
cases support the proposition that redemption rights are 
personal rights not attached to the property is incorrect. In 
Layton v. Thayne, the Tenth Circuit specifically held that 
redemption rights are personal rights. As the Court stated: 
It (Utah's statutory right of redemption) is a 
mere personal privilege rather than an 
interest or estate in land. . . . It does not 
constitute any interest or estate in the real 
estate itself. 
Layton v. Thayne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1943) 
Although this Court has not specifically held that the 
right of redemption is a personal right, the 10th Circuit's 
analysis of Utah's redemption law should be persuasive because 
the right of redemption is transferable for value, and should 
therefore remain an asset of the bankruptcy estate to satisfy 
the claims of creditors. 
Moreover, Bankruptcy Rule 6008, which provides for 
court approval of redemption, clearly contemplates that the 
Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction over redemption rights 
and the exercise thereof under applicable state law. 
-6-
POINT III 
WIND RIVER DID NOT PILE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 69(f)(2) TO EFFECT REDEMPTION AND SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE IS NOT BASIS TO GRANT WIND RIVER EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
At issue is whether Wind River complied with the 
provisions of Rule 69(f)(2) which provides the person seeking 
redemption must file the following documents: 
(1) a certified copy of the docket of the 
judgment under which the right to redeem, or, if he 
redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of 
the record thereof certified by the recorder; 
(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or 
proved where the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; 
(3) an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount then actually due on the lien. 
Wind River did not file any documents regarding 
requirements 1 and 3. 
Although Wind River did file a copy of an assignment, 
Tech-Fluid challenges the validity of the assignment. Gavilan 
argues that there was no certified judgment or memorandum of 
record of the lien to file in compliance with requirement #1. 
This claim is not supported by the record. 
Tech-Fluid obtained a judgment of foreclosure against 
the well on February 25, 1986 as against all parties except 
Paiute Oil. (R.423-425). Exhibit A to plaintiff's Reply 
-7-
Brief. Moreover, Tech-Fluid obtained an order of foreclosure 
on May 20, 1987 as to Paiute Oil (R.426) Exhibit B. Both 
documents were docketed with the Duchesne County Recorder's 
Office as is indicated on the face of each document. 
Additionally, there is a memorandum of record of the lien at 
the Duchesne County Recorder's Office. Therefore, documents 
do exist that should have been filed pursuant to Rule 
69(f)(2)(1) and Wind River's failure to comply is not excused 
under the facts. 
Moreover, Paiute Oil never filed the original of the 
assignment as required by Rule 69(f)(2)(2). The photocopy of 
the assignment that Wind River filed does not evidence a 
notary's seal and the signature of the notary is illegible. 
Indeed, had this document been notarized after the effective 
date of the Amendments to U.C.A. §45-1-13, the notarization 
would definitely have been invalid. §45-1-13 now requires 
that a notaries seal be reproducible in a photostatic copy. 
In this case there is simply no way to determine whether the 
assignment was properly acknowledged because Wind River did 
not file the original. "Properly acknowledged or proved" 
mandates the redemptors file the original assignment. 
Finally, requirement 3 requires the redemptioner to 
file "an affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount 
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then actually due on the lien." Wind River filed no affidavit 
of any kind, Gavilan fails to even address the issue in its 
brief. The trial court held however that Wind River's failure 
to file an affidavit or other documents did not defeat 
redemption because Wind River substantially complied with Rule 
69 and Tech-Fluid showed no prejudice, Gavilan relies on this 
Court's decision in United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1976) for authority that failure to comply with Rule 69 
is excusable in light of the remedial nature of the redemption 
statutes. 
This court in Mollerup v. Storage Systems 
International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) stated that 
redemption must be exercised in strict accord with the 
provisions of the rules unless there is a reason for the court 
to grant relief in equity and cited Loosely for authority for 
that limited exception to the strict compliance rule. 
Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d at 1124. 
There are no facts to move the conscience of the court 
to grant relief in equity for Wind River's failure to comply 
with the provisions of Rule 69(f)(2). Wind River's redemption 
is invalid and the trial court's determination should be 
reversed as it misapplied the court's decision in Loosely and 
Mollerup. 
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POINT IV 
IN ORDER TO PROPERLY REDEEM, GAVILAN, INC. MUST PAY 
THE AMOUNT OF THE LIEN OR THE LIEN STILL ATTACHES TO THE 
PROPERTY. 
A. Rule 69 and equity require a redeeming party to 
pay the lien of the purchasing creditor prior to redemption. 
At issue in this dispute is whether the redeeming 
assignee of the judgment debtor must pay the Lien in full 
before redeeming the well free and clear of the Tech-Fluid 
lien. Gavilan argues that it need only pay the sales price. 
Rule 69 and the case law do not support this interpretation. 
The parties agree that the key language in Rule 
69(f)(2) is the following: 
If the purchaser (plaintiff) is also a 
creditor having a lien ($89,000) prior to that 
of the person seeking redemption, other than 
the judgment under which said purchase was 
made the amount of such lien with interest. 
Additional language important to resolution of this 
dispute is found in Rule 69(f)(5) which states: 
If the judgment debtor redeems, he must make 
the same payments as are required to effect a 
redemption by a creditor. 
Thus the question arises as to what amount a junior 
lienor must pay in order to redeem the property. 
Gavilan argues that this provision only applies to 
situations where the purchaser has a prior lien on the 
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property in addition to the interest it obtained at the 
foreclosure sale* This interpretation makes no real world 
sense* Why would a lienholder with a lien prior to the one 
foreclosed care to redeem when it can obtain full compensation 
by foreclosing its own prior lien. 
Plaintiff submits that the purpose of the language of 
Rule 69(f)(3) and (5) is to require redemptioners to pay liens 
on the property prior to obtaining clear title. If the 
purchaser is not a creditor with a lien, then payment for the 
purchase price to the purchaser fully compensates the 
purchaser. If, however, the purchasers is also a creditor 
with a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, 
the lien must be paid in full regardless of the purchase price 
in order to fully compensate a lien holder. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that Rule 69 and the 
better reasoned case as Collins v. Riggs, 81 U.S. 491, 20 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1972) and its progeny require a redemptor to post 
the amount owing the purchasing creditor. There are sound 
policy reasons to support this position. First, a policy 
requiring full payment of a creditors lien will encourage 
parties to show up and bid at the foreclosure sale rather than 
waiting until after foreclosure. Creditors, junior 
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lienholders and the debtor will be better informed as to the 
true fair market value of property if interested parties are 
forced to come forward at the sale. Second, Collins 
interpretation of Rule 69 will bring our state laws into 
conformity with Federal law in that 28 U.S.C. 2410(d)(1) 
requires the United States to post the amount of the lien in 
addition to the sale price if it wishes to redeem property 
sold under a lien. Finally, the creditor and debtor will 
obtain exactly what they bargained for because the security 
will be released upon payment of the debt. 
B. Wind River's redemption did not extinguish 
Tech-Fluids lien as redemption merely restored the Wind River 
situation to the debtorfs pre sale estate. 
If the Court interprets Rule 69 to only require a 
redemptor to post the sale price, the issue then arises as to 
what estate did the redemptor obtain. Gavilan argues and the 
Court ruled that Tech-Fluid has no further interest in the 
property by virtue of the redemption. The ruling ignores the 
express language of Rule 69 which provides: "if the debtor 
redeems, the effect of the sale is terminated and he is 
restored to his estate." 
This court discussed the effect of redemption by an 
assignee of the judgment debtor in Bennion v. Amoss, 530 P.2d 
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810 (Utah 1975). In Bennion, this Court elaborated on the 
Rule 69 language stating that redemption by the assignee of 
the judgment debtor "restores the property to the same 
condition as if no sale had been attempted.11 I_d. at 812. If 
no sale had been attempted, the property quite clearly was 
encumbered by the Tech-Fluid lien. Thus, under the above 
language, redemption by the debtor or his successor in 
interest suspends the effect of the sale but does not 
extinguish the lien. There is dicta to the contrary in 
Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77 (Utah 1975) a case where the 
court upheld the docketing of a deficiency judgment against 
the debtor after redemption. In Clawson, this Court stated: 
Within the time allowed by law Spaulding 
(debtor) redeemed the land and thereby became 
owner of the realty. The mortgage was 
exhausted, and no further proceedings under it 
was possible. However, the deficiency 
judgment of Walker Bank would attach to any 
realty which either Spaulding or Mid Continent 
might have at the time might thereafter 
acquire within the eight year statute of 
limitations. 
The above quoted language is dicta in that it was not 
necessary for a determination of the issue in that case. 
Plaintiff argues this Court to reconcile the apparent 
contradicting language in Clawson and Bennion in favor of 
continuing the lien upon redemption as this interpretation 
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more appropriately conforms to the language in Rule 69(f)(5). 
By redeeming, Wind River bought time by stopping the sale of 
the well. It did not extinguish the lien. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
order the sheriff to issue a deed to the well in question to 
plaintiff. In the alternative, this Court should remand with 
instructions to allow Gavilan ten days to pay plaintiff the 
amount owed on the lien. 
DATED this ^O^ day of September, 1988. 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY H J SOUVALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief 
of Appellant to Clark B. Allred, Attorney for Respondent, 363 
East Main, Vernal, Utah 84078 on this ^ 0 K d a y of September, 
1988. 
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(801) 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERIVCES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 85-CV-13D 
This Court, having heretofore entered it's Order 
February 10, 1986, that defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy 
Group, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Duchesne County, a Body politic, 
within 10 days file proof with this Court of any evidence of 
ownership in that certain oil well and appurtenances thereto known 
as 13ND-1 and no proof of ownership having been filed therein by 
any of these defendants, IT IS ORDERED that their answers be 
stricken and that a judgment of foreclosure issue in favor of 
plaintiff as against said oil well. 
FILED 
042 
7 * DISTRICT COURT OUCHKNE 
STATE Of UTAH 
FEB 2 S1986 
ROGERK UARETT 
This Court, having been advised that defendant 
Paiute Oil c Mining Corp. is under the jurisdiction of the 
United Start«3 Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, plaintiff's 
rights as between this defendant will not be adjudicated at 
this time. ^ 
DATED this ffy day of February, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RICHARD C. DAVINDSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
>f the foregoing to the following on this 1r* day of February, 1986, 
Mr. Kent H. Murdock 
Attorney for Defendant Chevron 
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S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84145-0385 
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Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney for Paiute 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DIICMFSNE I'OUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH • FLUID SRRVITR.S , I UC . , 
Plaintiff, 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ,? h.wly politic, 
Defendants. 
n p r> v. R 
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McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Tech-Pluid 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re: 
PAIUTE OIL AND MINING 
CORPORATION, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620 
(Chapter 7) 
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 
AND ABANDONMENT 
The motion of Tech-Fluids for relief from automatic 
stay came before the Court; and no objections having been 
filed to the motions; and after filing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code is terminated as to Tech-Fluids, effective upon entry of 
this Order. The trustee is ordered to abandon the bankrupt's 
interest in Well ND13-1. 
DATED this J6 day May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rute 500S,'cx Designation 
•> Clerk
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